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Abstract 
In nonfinancial firms, higher risk taking results in lower dividend payout ratios. In banking, 
public guarantees may result in a positive relation between dividend payout ratios and risk 
taking. I investigate the interplay between dividend payout ratios and bank risk-taking allowing 
for the effect of charter values and capital adequacy regulation. I find a positive relation 
between bank risk-taking and dividend payout ratios. Proximity to the required capital ratio and 
a high charter value reduce the impact of bank risk-taking on the dividend payout ratio. My 
results are robust to different proxies for the dividend payout ratio and bank risk-taking.   
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1. Introduction 
The literature on the determinants of dividend payout ratios tends to exclude regulated 
industries from the analysis. An exception is Hansen et al. (1994), who investigate the relation 
between dividend payout ratios and monitoring in the utilities industry. In this paper, I take a 
closer look at the determinants of dividend payout ratios of another important regulated 
industry: The banking industry.  
The new Basel III framework imposes restrictions on dividends for undercapitalised banks 
(Caruana, 2010), but it is unclear whether previous versions of the framework were effective in 
curbing risk-shifting. To fill this gap in the literature, I provide an empirical investigation of 
three important research questions: Are bank risk-taking and dividend payout ratios related? 
Have minimum capital requirements been successful in preventing banks from using dividends 
as a risk-shifting device? Is a high charter value (also franchise value) a deterrent for risk-
shifting via high dividend payout ratios?  
These questions are crucial for policy makers that aim to mitigate the impact of moral hazard on 
bank safety and, due to the importance of bank safety for the real economy, for society as a 
whole. Moreover, these questions are key to understanding the dynamics of the relation between 
the dividend payout ratio and risk-taking for industries where regulators and creditors are 
important stakeholders. Therefore, answering these questions is of interest to banking and 
corporate finance academics alike, as well as policy makers and regulators.  
I investigate the role of high dividend payout ratios as a risk-shifting mechanism that can 
exacerbate moral hazard deriving from public guarantees, allowing for the effect of capital 
adequacy requirements and heterogeneity in charter values. In contrast with Acharya et al. 
(2011), I do not focus specifically on the crisis period. I investigate the relation between 
dividend payout ratios and bank risk-taking during the years 2000-2007, before the 2008-2009 
recession, to limit the influence of extraordinary regulatory measures on my analysis. Focussing 
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on the period 2000-2007 also mitigates concerns regarding heterogeneous responses to the 
implementation of Basel II.
1
  
The main hypothesis tested in the paper, henceforth referred to as the risk-shifting hypothesis, 
posits that risk taking is positively related to dividend payout ratios, since banks can pay 
dividends to transfer default risk to their creditors and (when bailouts take place) to the taxpayer. 
For consistency with previous literature on dividend policy of nonfinancial firms, and to avoid 
excluding unlisted banks from the investigation, I employ dividends to net income as main 
proxy for the dividend payout ratio. However, robustness tests show that my results hold even 
when using alternative proxies for the dividend payout ratio: dividends to book value of equity, 
dividends to market value of equity, and dividends plus share repurchases to market value of 
equity.  
In addition to the risk-shifting hypothesis, this paper investigates two additional hypotheses, 
relating to the influence of capital adequacy requirements and charter values: According to the 
opportunity cost hypothesis, undercapitalised banks (banks with a regulatory capital ratio close 
to the minimum allowed by capital adequacy regulation) should decrease dividend payout ratios 
to avoid future actions by the regulators. According to the charter value hypothesis, banks with 
high charter values should be discouraged from paying dividends to preserve the charter.  
I test the three hypotheses above on a sample of 741 U.S. and EU banks, and subsequently on a 
sub-sample of 166 listed banks. Investigating listed banks separately has several advantages. 
First, for listed banks the signalling content associated with dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979; 
John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985) may affect bank dividend policy. Agency 
costs (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) and catering incentives (Baker and Wurgler, 2004) may 
also play a role, although evidence on the latter is mixed (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009).
2
  Second, 
                                               
1 Basel II rules were adopted in the EU as early as 2006, but the new rules of capital adequacy requirements were not 
fully implemented until 2008. In the U.S., Basel II was only partially adopted, and became effective from April 2008. 
2 Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) suggest that the dividend premium may proxy for risk rather than dividend fads.  
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for listed banks I can employ forward-looking measures of risk taking that are based on both 
accounting and market based information. In particular, for the analysis regarding both listed 
and unlisted banks I employ an accounting measure of distance to default (the log of the Z-
score), while for the analysis regarding listed banks only I employ a measure of distance to 
default that is based on both accounting and market data (Bharath and Shumway’s distance to 
default) and, in robustness tests, the related concept of Expected Default Frequency (EDF).
3
    
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  
First, it provides novel evidence of a positive relation between bank risk-taking and dividend 
payout ratios in banking, controlling for heterogeneity in the regulatory capital position and 
charter value of the bank.  
Second, it sheds light on the impact of capital adequacy requirements on dividend payout ratios 
prior to and during the crisis (2008-2009), while recent papers (such as Acharya et al., 2011) 
focus only on the crisis period. I find that banks that are close to the minimum capital 
requirement have significantly lower dividends payout ratios than well-capitalised banks. These 
results are consistent with the view that capital adequacy regulations in force before Basel III 
were somewhat effective in offsetting the positive relation between dividend payout ratios and 
bank risk-taking. In this respect, I also provide evidence that Prompt Corrective Actions (PCA) 
in the U.S. help curb the dividend payout ratio when the bank is close to the regulatory 
minimum.  
Third, banks with higher charter value have lower dividend payout ratios, consistent with the 
view that when charter value is high, banks have an incentive to preserve the charter (Keeley, 
1990). 
                                               
3 Recent papers employ distance to default measures as a proxy for bank risk-taking (for instance, Hagendorff and 
Vallascas, 2011). 
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Finally, recent empirical studies on the determinants of dividend payout ratios in nonfinancial 
firms (Li and Zhao, 2008; Chay and Suh, 2009) neglect the autoregressive nature of the 
dividend payout ratio. Since the lagged payout ratio may well be correlated with other 
determinants of the current dividend payout ratio, this approach can lead to omitted variable 
bias. I employ a dynamic panel data model to adequately model an autoregressive component in 
the dividend payout ratio.  
My results are robust to the proxy for agency costs between insiders and outsiders (Rozeff, 
1982), the legal framework of the country of origin (La Porta et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001), 
and inclusion of the crisis period (2008-2009) in the analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data set. Section 4 
reports the main results and robustness checks. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
This section briefly reviews the literature on dividend policy of nonfinancial firms and banks, 
and develops the hypotheses. 
2.1.  Literature on dividend policy: A brief review 
Dividend policy is a key topic in the financial economics literature. Most of the literature on 
dividend policy is concerned with the importance of dividend policy for firm value. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) introduce the idea of irrelevance of dividend policy for the value of a firm. 
However, their theory is grounded upon the concept of “perfect” capital markets with rational 
investors.  
Dividend policy may be relevant for firm value because of imperfections in real financial 
markets. The early literature studies three main real-market imperfections (Lease et al., 2000): 
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different tax rates on dividends and capital gains, informational asymmetries between insiders 
and outsiders, and agency costs. More recently, the literature has also investigated the role of the 
legal framework of the country of origin (La Porta et al., 2000), catering incentives (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004), and the stage of the life-cycle of the firm (DeAngelo et al., 2006). Baker et al. 
(2002) provide a useful survey of seminal contributions in the dividend policy literature.  
Identifying the impact of different determinants of dividend policy unambiguously is a daunting 
challenge, and the empirical literature has produced mixed results with regard to the impact of 
tax clienteles, signalling effects, and life-cycle factors (Farrar and Selwyn, 1967; Brennan, 
1970; Healy and Palepu, 1988; Grullon et al., 2005; DeAngelo et al., 2006; von Eije and 
Megginson, 2008; Denis and Osobov, 2008; De Cesari, 2012). Exploiting a unique historical 
setting, Turner et al. (2013) provide evidence that the information content of dividends is more 
important than agency, catering, or behavioural determinants of dividend policy. 
The banking literature has so far overlooked the topic of dividend policy, with some exceptions 
regarding primarily the signalling power of dividend cuts and omissions in banks (Keen, 1983; 
Bessler and Nohel, 1996, 2000). In particular, the study of the determinants of dividend payout 
ratios in banking is so far an under-researched area. This paper contributes to the literature on 
the determinants of the dividend payout ratio, and extends the findings of studies on the effect 
of risk taking on the dividend payout ratio (Rozeff, 1982; Chay and Suh, 2009) to the banking 
sector. 
I borrow from two main strands of literature to develop my hypotheses. The first strand 
investigates the determinants of the dividend payout ratio of nonfinancial firms. The second 
strand examines the relation between regulation and bank risk-taking, and illustrates why certain 
types of regulation produce moral hazard (which, in turn, is related to the literature on market 
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discipline).
4
 Section 2.2 examines this latter strand of literature and develops the hypotheses 
tested in this paper.  
2.2.  Hypotheses 
Deposit insurance regulation, and public guarantees in general, may increase the likelihood of 
moral hazard in the form of excessive risk taking because it discourages monitoring from 
depositors. Deposit insurance can be thought of as a put option on the bank’s assets (Merton, 
1977), whose value is positively related to business risk and leverage. Under a fixed-rate system, 
banks can exploit the deposit insurance by increasing leverage and risk (Keeley, 1990). In the 
event of default, banks can exploit deposit insurance to obtain wealth from the insuring agency. 
Accordingly, the value of deposit insurance is positively related to default risk.  
Dividends play an important role for the pricing of public guarantees. Dividends decrease the 
value of assets, which implies a decrease in the value of both equity and debt, but benefit only 
the owners of the bank – equity is ‘dividend protected’ (Ronn and Verma, 1986).5 Ceteris 
paribus, higher dividend payout ratios increase default risk and the value of public guarantees 
(implicit or explicit). Moreover, banks tend to sell their safer assets to distribute dividends, and 
leave on their balance sheets the riskier assets (Acharya et al., 2011).  
In the absence of specific regulations that curb dividend payments in times of distress, bank 
owners/managers can ‘loot’ the public by strategically increasing dividend payout ratios, to 
extract wealth from bank creditors (depositors) and the insuring agency (Akerlof and Romer, 
1993).  
Based on these considerations, the main hypothesis tested in this paper is as follows. 
                                               
4 Recent research has investigated whether regulations in the financial sector (particularly deposit insurance and 
capital adequacy regulation) impinge on the determinants of the financing decisions of banks (Gropp and Heider, 
2010). This paper assumes a similar perspective, in that it investigates the dynamics of the relation between dividends 
and risk under bank regulations. 
5 For an analytical discussion about the pricing of public guarantees and dividends, see Appendix. 
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H1: Risk-shifting hypothesis 
Bank risk-taking is positively related to dividend payout ratios. 
To restrain moral hazard deriving from public guarantees, bank regulators have introduced 
capital adequacy requirements proportional to a bank’s risky assets. Capital adequacy 
requirements should counteract moral hazard because they force banks to internalise the adverse 
consequences of excessive risk taking. Undercapitalised banks can improve their capital 
position either by means of dividend cuts or by issuing new equity capital. Because raising new 
equity capital is expensive (Hellmann et al., 2000) and conveys negative information to the 
financial market (Polonchek et al., 1989), paying dividends implies foregoing the opportunity to 
raise the required capital (at no additional cost) by retaining earnings. High payout ratios 
increase the likelihood of dividend cuts in the future, which can result in large drops in bank 
stock returns (Lintner, 1956; Polonchek et al., 1989; Bessler and Nohel, 1996). Therefore, 
undercapitalised banks should distribute a smaller percentage of earnings than well-capitalised 
banks. 
H2: Opportunity cost hypothesis 
Undercapitalised banks have lower dividend payout ratios than well-capitalised banks. 
Acharya et al. (2012) introduce a theoretical model that highlights the importance of charter 
values in the dynamics of the relation between risk-shifting incentives and dividends. In a 
nutshell, Acharya et al. (2012) argue that banks may pay excessive amounts of dividends 
because they do not internalize the negative externalities that generous dividend policies may 
impose on other banks (via the interbank lending channel). The model stresses that risk-shifting 
is more likely to occur in periods during which charter values are low, consistent with previous 
literature arguing that when charter values are low, banks have little to lose and the incentive to 
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gamble and exploit public guarantees is high (Keeley, 1990).
6
 On the other hand, when charter 
values are high the incentive to exploit public guarantees is low because liquidation would 
prevent bank owners from selling the charter (i.e., the charter value would be lost). Therefore, 
banks with high charter values should be less inclined to engage in risk shifting via dividend 
payments. These considerations lead to the following testable hypothesis: 
H3: Charter value hypothesis 
Charter value is negatively related to dividend payout ratios. 
3. Methodology and Data 
This section describes the methodology, data collection, and the construction of the sample. 
3.1. Methodology 
I investigate the nexus between dividend payout ratios and bank risk-taking using a dynamic 
panel data model. Previous research on the determinants of payout ratios in nonfinancial firms 
employs dividends to net income (DP) as a dependent variable. For comparability with this 
literature, I employ DP as a proxy for the dividend payout ratio for the sample including all 
banks. For the sub-sample of listed banks only, I employ the ratio of dividends to market value 
of equity (DY) and, in robustness tests, the total payout ratio (dividends plus share repurchases 
divided by the market value of equity).  
DP becomes infinite when earnings are zero, and when earnings are negative there is a negative 
relation between dividends and the dividend payout ratio. Following Chay and Suh (2009) I 
drop observations for which DP is negative.
7
 Robustness tests show that the results do not 
                                               
6 For instance, Keeley (1990) ascribes the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the 1980s to more intense competition 
between banks (driven by deposit rate deregulation). Fiercer competition caused a decline in the charter value of 
savings and loan institutions. In such circumstances, these institutions were incentivised to exploit the put option 
implied by the deposit insurance scheme.  
7 Replacing these observations with a zero does not change substantially my results. 
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change substantially when using dividends to book value of equity (DE). Using DE eliminates 
the possibility of negative dividend payout ratios.  
The specification of the model is as follows: 
Yit = α + ρYit-1 + 'xit + γ'cit + it       (1) 
it = ηi + νit 
E[ηi] = E[νit] = E[ηi, νit] 
ηi ~ N(0,
2
 ), and νit ~ N(0,
2
) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N indexes observational units (banks); t = 1, 2, …, T indexes time (years); 
Yit is the proxy for the payout ratio, DP;  and γ are vectors of coefficients; xit is a vector of 
covariates, including the main explanatory variables associated with the three hypotheses; and 
cit is a vector of controls. The error term it consists of an unobserved panel-level effect ηi (fixed 
for each bank i) and an idiosyncratic component vit (independent and identically distributed over 
all observations). 
Due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable Yit-1 among the regressors, a dynamic 
panel data specification is required (Nickell, 1981). The generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimator, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and refined by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), eliminates ηi via differencing, and allows for E(ΔYit-1, 
Δνit) ≠ 0 using the lagged levels of Yit-1 as instruments (Yit-2 is correlated to ΔYit-1 but 
uncorrelated to Δνit). While Arellano and Bond’s (1991) estimator (GMM-DIF) employs only 
lagged levels of Yit-1 as instruments in the first-differenced equation, Blundell and Bond’s 
(1998) estimator (GMM-SYS), based upon Arellano and Bover (1995), involves a system of 
first-differenced and level equations, where lags of levels (in the former) and lags of the first 
differences (in the latter) are employed as instruments. Similar to Khan (2006) and Andres et al. 
(2009), I prefer the GMM-SYS to GMM-DIF for my analysis. 
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As pointed out by Roodman (2009), the GMM-SYS has one main drawback. The use of too 
many instruments can weaken the Hansen (1982) test of over-identifying restrictions, leading to 
an undersized test. To address the issue of instrument proliferation, I employ the collapsing 
technique suggested by Roodman (2009). This technique employs one instrument for each 
endogenous variable and lag length (instead of one for each time period, endogenous variable, 
and lag length), considerably reducing the number of instruments.  
3.2. Definition of explanatory variables 
In this section, I briefly define the variables employed to test H1–H3. I test the risk-shifting 
hypothesis (H1) using several proxies for bank risk-taking: the log of the Z-score (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009; Schaeck et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2013); a forward-looking measure of distance to 
default (introduced by Bharath and Shumway, 2008), which I denote as Naïve DD; and the EDF 
based on Naïve DD. Employing only forward-looking measures based on stock price data would 
result in sample selection bias, while using these three measures improves the robustness of my 
results and allows considering both listed and unlisted banks. These three measures are defined 
in detail in Table 1. According to H1, there should be a negative relation between the log of the 
Z-score and the dividend payout ratio, between Naïve DD and the dividend payout ratio, and 
between {–EDF} and the dividend payout ratio.  
I test the opportunity cost hypothesis (H2) by creating a dummy variable (Close) equal to one if 
either the tier 1 ratio (Tier 1) of the previous year is below 6% or the total regulatory capital 
ratio (TCR) of the previous year is below 10%, and zero otherwise. The total regulatory capital 
ratio is total regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets under Basel rules. Tier 1 is tier 1 
capital divided by risk-weighted assets under Basel rules. According to H2, the coefficient on 
Close should be negative. 
The banking literature suggests that customer (demand) deposits contribute to a bank’s charter 
value (Marcus, 1984; James, 1991; Hutchison and Pennacchi, 1996; Goyal, 2005; Schaeck et al., 
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2012).  To test H3, I create a dummy variable (High Charter) that takes on the value one if the 
ratio of customer deposits to total assets is larger than the sample median (charter value is high), 
and zero otherwise (charter value is low). For H3 to hold, the coefficient of High Charter should 
be negative. In the tests using listed banks only (and Naïve DD or EDF as a measure of risk 
taking), I employ the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for charter value (Cebenoyan et al., 1999).  
The existing literature about dividend policies in nonfinancial firms finds that the following firm 
characteristics can influence dividend policy: insider–outsider (IO) conflict (Easterbrook, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986; Faccio et al., 2001), asset growth (Fama and French, 2001), size (Fama and 
French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Denis and Osobov, 2008), profitability (Fama and French, 
2001; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Denis and Osobov, 2008), earned equity (DeAngelo et al., 2006; 
von Eije and Megginson, 2008; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007), a recent quotation on the stock 
market (Cornett et al., 2008), and the legal framework of the country of origin (La Porta et al., 
2000). Consequently, I include several control variables to allow for the impact of these factors. 
These variables are listed and briefly defined in Table 1.  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
3.3. Data 
Tables 2a and 2b summarise the construction of the sample for all banks and listed banks only, 
respectively. As reported in Table 2a, I collect consolidated bank account data for 741 banks 
(bank holding companies, hereafter BHCs; commercial banks; cooperative banks; and savings 
banks) located in either the U.S. or the European Union, hereafter EU (27 countries),
8
 from the 
Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope database. These banks are depository institutions, and therefore are 
subject to PCA in the U.S., but not in the EU.  
                                               
8 For the EU sub-sample, the only country for which there are no observations is Cyprus.  
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Due to data availability on Thomson One Analytics (from which I collect daily closing prices), I 
am able to construct Naïve DD for 187 banks out of the original sample of 741 banks. Data on 
the dependent variable and all explanatory variables is available for 166 listed banks, which 
constitute our final sample. 
[Insert Tables 2a and 2b here] 
Tables 3 and 4 report the sample composition and descriptive statistics for the whole sample 
(Panel A) and the sub-sample of 166 listed banks (Panel B), respectively.  
For Panel A, the majority of the banks in the sample are BHCs (52%), followed by commercial 
banks (38%). Most of the banks are located in the U.S. (59%). The majority of the U.S. sub-
sample consists of BHCs (81%, but only 9% for the EU), while the majority of the EU sub-
sample comprises commercial banks (65%, but only 18% for the U.S.). Most of the sample 
consists of banks that were listed in at least one of the years comprising the sample period 
(53%).  There is no significant difference between the average DP of U.S. and EU banks, and 
between the average DP of listed and unlisted banks. U.S. banks are less risky than EU banks in 
terms of LnZ and SDROA, and they have a higher average Capital Ratio (ratio of equity to total 
assets). Consistent with this latter finding, the mean for the dummy variable Close is lower for 
U.S. banks than for EU banks. High Charter is, on average, larger for U.S. banks than for EU 
banks and it is, on average, larger for listed banks than for unlisted banks. 
For Panel B, the statistics are similar, but the percentage of BHC and U.S. banks increases: they 
comprise 71% and 63% of the sample, respectively. Only one U.S. bank is not a BHC, while the 
EU sample is more heterogeneous, with a prevalence of commercial banks (62%). U.S. banks 
have a significantly lower DY than EU banks. Similar to Panel A, U.S. banks are less risky than 
EU banks: on average, they have a significantly larger Naïve DD and a significantly lower EDF 
and Close. On the other hand, the average High Charter is not significantly different from that 
of EU banks. 
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[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
Pairwise correlation analysis (unreported for the sake of space) shows that for Panel A the 
variable LnZ is negatively correlated with both SDROA and Close. This supports the validity of 
LnZ as a proxy for risk taking.
9
 Banks with higher charter value exhibit higher LnZ values, 
suggesting that banks with high charter values have an incentive to avoid liquidation. For Panel 
B, Naïve DD is negatively correlated with EDF (the coefficient is -0.985) and positively 
correlated with LnZ, suggesting that the three proxies are likely to identify high-risk banks in a 
consistent manner.   
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the GMM-SYS regressions as well as a battery of robustness 
tests. The results are reported separately for the whole sample (Panel A), and for a sub-sample 
of listed banks (Panel B).  
The rest of this section is as follows. Section 4.1 presents the main results and robustness tests 
for the whole sample of 741 banks, and related sub-samples. Section 4.2 reports the results for 
the sub-sample of 166 listed banks, using Naïve DD as a proxy for risk taking (I do not report 
the results for {–EDF}, since the results are the same) and dividends to market value of equity 
as a proxy for the payout ratio. Section 4.3 provides an analysis of the impact of share 
repurchases. Finally, Section 4.4 briefly discusses the main results in relation to the existing 
literature on dividend payout ratios in nonfinancial firms, and the banking literature on market 
discipline, capital adequacy regulation, and charter values. 
4.1. Results for the whole sample  
                                               
9 The validity of LnZ as a proxy for bank risk is also confirmed by a negative and significant correlation between LnZ 
and the ratios of loan loss provisions to total loans (Altunbas et al., 2007).  
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This section presents the main results of the GMM-SYS regressions. First, I run the GMM-SYS 
models with LnZ and the controls (I test only H1). Second, I test H1 and H2 by including in the 
regressions the dummy variable Close and the interaction term Close   LnZ. Third, I test H1 and 
H3 by including in the regressions the dummy variable High Charter and the interaction term 
High Charter   LnZ. Finally, I include LnZ, Close, High Charter, and the respective interaction 
terms to test H1, H2, and H3 in the same regressions. Since cooperative banks and savings banks 
may pursue objectives other than profit maximization, I report separately the results for 
regressions run on the whole sample and for BHC and commercial banks only.
10
  
Table 5 reports estimation results for the dynamic panel data models. For the sake of exposition 
and to preserve space, the coefficients of the control variables are not included in Table 5. I 
allow for endogeneity with respect to both DP(-1) and LnZ using GMM instruments. The 
diagnostic statistics for all specifications are consistent with the assumptions of the GMM-SYS 
model. 
For model 1, the coefficient of LnZ is negative and significant, supporting H1. For model 2, the 
coefficient of LnZ is still negative and significant. However, the coefficient of Close is negative 
and significant, suggesting that banks that are close to the regulatory minimum make lower 
payout ratios with respect to well-capitalised banks, consistent with H2. For model 3, the 
coefficient of LnZ is still negative and significant. The coefficient of High Charter is negative 
and significant, supporting H3. Finally, the results for model 4 confirm those of the other 
specifications.
11
 
                                               
10 As a preliminary analysis, I investigate the appropriateness of LnZ as a proxy for risk taking. I run a probit 
regression where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value one if the bank equity to total assets ratio 
(ETA) was less than 4% or 5% in either 2008 or 2009, and zero otherwise, and LnZ in 2007 is the independent 
variable. The intuition is that, if LnZ correctly proxies for risk taking, its current value should be negatively related to 
the future capital position of the bank. The coefficient on LnZ is negative and significant at the 1% level when either 
4% or 5% is considered as a threshold for ETA. When I repeat the analysis considering Tier 1 instead of ETA, the 
coefficient on LnZ remains negative and strongly significant. These results suggest that, while LnZ is an accounting-
based measure, it perform reasonably well as a forward-looking risk measure. The results of this analysis are 
available from the author upon request. 
11 To understand whether the recession in 2008 and 2009 has had any impact on the dividend policy of banks, I 
extend the sample period from 2000-2007 to 2000-2009. The coefficients of a dummy variable, Crisis, which takes 
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Considering the lower bound of the coefficient on LnZ (-0.081), an increase in LnZ by one 
standard deviation (0.996) results in a decrease of DP by about 8%. Since the average DP is 
41%, the results are economically significant for banks that are not close to the regulatory 
minimum and have low charter values. The results for Close and High Charter are also 
economically significant, and the results for the interaction terms suggest that capital adequacy 
requirements reduce moral hazard for banks with low capital ratios, while the desire to preserve 
the charter offsets the propensity to shift risk when the charter value is high.
12
  
   [Insert table 5 here] 
As it is common in empirical studies, robustness checks are in order. I start with an 
investigation of possible heterogeneous effects due to differences in the legal framework of the 
country of origin, following the classification by La Porta et al. (1998). In this spirit, I estimate 
the regressions for countries with an English origin only (UK and U.S.), since banks from other 
countries may be too heterogeneous to be comparable. By focusing on these two countries only, 
I can rule out differences in dividend payout ratios that are due to poor protection of minority 
shareholders. As reported in Table 6, the results remain substantially unaltered regardless of 
whether the whole sub-sample of banks from Common Law countries or BHC and commercial 
banks only are considered. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Further investigation is needed with respect to the specific banking regulatory framework of the 
U.S. and the EU. In particular, U.S. banks may be subject to dividend restrictions due to PCA 
when their regulatory capital approaches the regulatory minimum. A bank cannot pay dividends 
                                                                                                                                         
on the value 1 if the year is either 2008 or 2009 and 0 otherwise, are insignificant. The results for the main 
explanatory variables do not change substantially. 
12 The results for the control variables (unreported but available upon request) are either insignificant or consistent 
with expectations, with the exception of the coefficient of IPO for model 1, which is negative.  
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if doing so would cause the bank to be undercapitalised. Every depository institution that is 
member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is subject to PCA. 
I construct a dummy, PCA, which is equal to one if Close =1 and U.S. =1, and zero otherwise. 
As shown in Table 7, when I include PCA in the regressions, its coefficient is always negative 
and strongly significant, while the other main coefficients remain unaltered. Therefore, PCA 
further reduce the risk that dividends be used as a risk-shifting device. 
    [Insert table 7 here] 
I run further tests to assess the robustness of the main results. The results for these tests are not 
reported but are available upon request. 
First, I run the regressions after winsorisation of the dependent variable and all continuous 
explanatory variables at the first and 99
th
 percentile. The results confirm those reported in Table 
5. Second, when I replace DP with DE (dividends to equity) the results remain the same as 
those reported in Table 5. Finally, my results hold even after replacing the dummy variable 
Listed Bank with two other proxies for the IO–conflict: the variables Recorded Shareholders, 
and the dummies IND1 and IND3 (which indicate the degree of independence of the bank from 
large shareholders). 
4.2. Results for a sub-sample of listed banks 
The results reported in Table 8 confirm a positive and significant relation between risk taking 
and the dividend payout ratio (i.e. the coefficient on Naïve DD is negative and significant). The 
diagnostic statistics support the validity of the assumptions for the GMM regressions. 
Considering the lower bound of the coefficient on Naïve DD, an increase in Naïve DD by one 
standard deviation decreases DY by about 0.3%. Since the average DY is 2.7%, these results 
suggest that the impact of risk taking on the dividend payout ratio is economically significant 
for banks that are not close to the regulatory minimum and have low charter values. The 
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coefficients on High Charter and High Charter   Naïve DD are significant and with the 
expected sign. However, the coefficients on Close and Close   Naïve DD are insignificant, as a 
result of a very low number of observations for which Close takes on the value one (19 
observations for 15 banks). 
Similar to what reported in Tables 6 and 7 for the whole sample, the results remain substantially 
the same when only banks from the US and the UK are considered, and when PCA is included 
in the regressions. However, in this case the coefficient on PCA is insignificant. The results are 
also robust to the proxy for the IO-conflict (Recorded Shareholders, and the dummies IND1 and 
IND3), and to inclusion of the 2008-2009 period.  
[Insert table 8 here] 
4.3. Extension: The impact of share repurchases 
As a further robustness test, I examine the impact of share repurchases. Share repurchases are 
non-binding (unlike ordinary dividends), and therefore do not contain the same signalling 
content of dividends (Allen et al., 2009). Due to the binding nature of dividend payments, they 
can address agency conflicts more effectively than share repurchases (John and Knyazeva, 
2006; De Cesari, 2012). Share repurchases, on the other hand, tend to occur to pay out transitory 
earnings (Jagannathan et al., 2000). Because share repurchases can harm the capital adequacy of 
a bank, and restrictions on both dividends and share repurchases are now included in the Basel 
III framework, I incorporate share repurchases in the analysis to further improve the robustness 
of my findings.
13
 
I calculate the payout from share repurchases (SP) as the total number of shares repurchased 
times the average price using data from SNL Financial. I merge this dataset with data from 
                                               
13 While share repurchases tend to be rather common in the U.S. and (to a lesser extent) in the UK, in continental 
Europe share repurchases are rare, and in certain countries, such as France and Germany, they were illegal or subject 
to very strict regulation until the late nineties (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002). 
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Thomson One (stock price data), and Bankscope (dividends and other accounting variables). I 
calculate the total payout ratio as the sum of DY and SY (SP divided by the market value of 
equity), and I denote it TP.
14
 Table 9 reports the results of the regressions for TP. The results are 
substantially the same as those reported in Table 8 for DY.   
[Insert table 9 here] 
4.4. Discussion of the main results 
My results suggest that banks that are closer to default tend to have higher payout ratios, 
regardless of the proxy employed for the payout ratio or for bank risk-taking.  
Since for banks close to the regulatory minimum this positive relation is negligible, these results 
do not necessarily suggest that capital adequacy regulation prior to Basel II was ineffective in 
curbing risk-shifting deriving from high dividend payout ratios. However, if capital 
requirements are not highly correlated with the actual risk taking of the bank, high risk taking 
and high dividend payout ratios may persist. In unreported results, I find that a negative and 
significant correlation exists between Close and LnZ and Naïve DD, while there is a positive 
and significant correlation between Close and EDF. Therefore, to the extent that LnZ, Naïve DD, 
and EDF capture correctly bank risk-taking, it is unlikely that banks close to default increased 
their dividend payout ratio during the sample period. These results are not necessarily 
inconsistent with those presented by Acharya et al. (2011), who suggests that, during the 
financial crisis, banks kept paying dividends despite anticipating large losses in their portfolios.  
Banks may have kept paying dividends without increasing the dividend payout ratio. Therefore, 
my results should not be interpreted as evidence that further dividend restrictions for 
undercapitalised banks are unnecessary. 
                                               
14 Since TP is highly leptokurtic (kurtosis is over 640) and positively skewed (skewness is over 20), I winsorise the 
data at the 95th percentile before running the regressions. As a result of winsorisation, excess sample kurtosis is 
eliminated and sample skewness is around 0.6. 
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The results for the sample of both listed and unlisted banks suggest that U.S. banks decrease 
payout ratios to a greater extent than EU banks when they are close to the minimum capital 
requirement. This finding is consistent with the view that PCA are useful in decreasing moral 
hazard, and supports the recent changes in the Basel Accord (Basel III) that impose progressive 
dividend restrictions on banks that are undercapitalised (Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Caruana, 
2010). In light of the results on the impact of charter value on payout ratios, dividend 
restrictions would be particularly useful in periods of high competition, when charter values are 
low (Keeley, 1990), or during periods of weak economic growth. 
My results are also in line with the predictions put forward by Acharya et al. (2012), who model 
the theoretical relation between risk-shifting incentives, dividends, and charter values. Acharya 
et al. (2012) show that during financial crises, when charter values are low, banks may be 
incentivised to implement dividend policies inconsistent with maximization of social welfare. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that provides evidence on the importance of 
different types of capital adequacy regulations and charter values on the relation between bank 
dividend policy and risk taking.    
My findings also complement recent contributions on the relation between dividends, 
competition (which affects charter values), and business risk. Booth and Zhou (2009) provide 
evidence that firms in highly competitive environments face higher levels of risk, and this may 
in turn result in a lower likelihood of a dividend and smaller dividend payouts for the firms that 
decide to pay dividends. Similarly, Zhou et al. (2013) argue that the phenomenon of 
disappearing dividends in the U.S. (Fama and French, 2001) could be associated with 
competition from foreign firms. My findings show that when risk-shifting incentives are 
distorted by regulation (such as deposit insurance), stronger competition that decreases charter 
values (Keeley, 1990) increases dividend payout ratios.  
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Finally, my findings are related to the growing body of literature on ‘market discipline’ in banks 
(among others, Ellis and Flannery, 1992; Goyal, 2005; Schaeck et al., 2012). My results show 
that capital requirements are effective in reducing risk-shifting incentives, which can be 
interpreted as evidence of regulator discipline. In addition to this, I provide evidence that a high 
ratio of customer deposits to total assets has a negative impact on the positive relation between 
bank risk-taking and dividend payout ratios. This latter finding can be interpreted as evidence of 
‘depositor discipline’. 
5. Concluding Remarks   
Previous literature has reported that banks kept paying dividends during the recent financial 
crisis, despite a call from regulators to restrain dividend payments to maintain financial stability 
and foster economic recovery through lending growth. This issue is important because an 
excessively generous bank dividend policy is inconsistent with maximization of social welfare: 
High dividend payout ratios can effectively transfer wealth from depositors and the taxpayer to 
bank shareholders (risk-shifting), resulting in substantial negative externalities in periods of 
economic slowdown. 
In this paper, I have provided robust evidence that dividend payout ratios and bank risk-taking 
are positively correlated, contrary to the received wisdom reported in the literature on 
nonfinancial firms. However, such correlation is affected by the regulatory capital ratio and the 
charter value of the bank: Capital adequacy requirements and a high charter value reduce risk-
shifting.  
My findings bear important policy implications. First, because of regulatory capital 
management practices, the previous versions of the Basel framework could result in a belated 
response to risk-shifting, especially in countries where PCA do not exist. Under Basel III rules, 
banks must maintain a conservation buffer consisting of Tier 1 capital only, reducing the 
likelihood of regulatory capital management. If the buffer is breached, earnings distributions 
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(such as dividends and share repurchases) are capped. Therefore, Basel III should reduce further 
the likelihood of risk-shifting.   
Second, in light of the findings on the role of charter values, pro-cyclicality in bank charter 
values should also be considered. In this respect, the new countercyclical capital buffer 
introduced by Basel III, which also entails restrictions on dividends and share repurchases if the 
buffer is breached, may only partially address the problem. Such countercyclical requirement 
would reduce dividend payout ratios during periods of economic growth, helping banks to 
withstand macroeconomic shocks. However, it is during economic slowdowns that bank charter 
values are low and risk-shifting through dividends and share repurchases is more likely. My 
findings suggest that a more thorough theoretical analysis of the impact of the countercyclical 
capital buffer on risk-shifting incentives is called for. Empirical studies could follow in the 
forthcoming years, after implementation of Basel III. 
Further research could also investigate the impact of corporate governance and ownership 
structure on risk-shifting incentives. For instance, the literature on managerial entrenchment 
predicts higher dividend payout ratios for firms where the executives are entrenched. Thus, for 
banks where managers are entrenched the problem of risk-shifting could be more intense, and 
regulatory monitoring should increase accordingly. Similarly, in group-affiliated banks outside 
shareholders could require higher dividend payout ratios to dampen expropriation from 
controlling shareholders. An assessment of the costs and benefits of restrictions on dividends 
and share repurchases in such cases is a challenging task, because stronger protection of 
depositors may lead to expropriation of outside shareholders. Theoretical and empirical 
contributions in this direction could help policy makers develop regulations that strike a balance 
between safeguarding the interest of outside shareholders and maintaining financial stability. 
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Appendix  
Analytical explanation of the relationship between the value of common equity, dividends, 
and risk. 
In this appendix I give a brief account of the models by Merton (1974, 1977) on the pricing of 
corporate debt and of the cost of deposit insurance, and how they relate to dividend payments 
and risk. For details regarding the models, I refer the reader to Merton (1974, 1977), and Ronn 
and Verma (1986).  
The model on the pricing of corporate debt developed by Merton (1974) is based on the 
isomorphic relation between common equity of a levered firm and a common stock call option. 
The model on the pricing of deposit insurance developed by Merton (1977) relies upon the 
isomorphic relation between loan guarantees and common stock put options, and can be applied 
to any guarantee of a third party on behalf of the borrower, such as guarantees of a parent 
company for a loan made by a third party to one of its subsidiaries.  
Assume that the value of assets of a bank at time t (At) follows a Geometric Brownian motion: 
dln(At) = μdt + σdWt        (A1) 
where μ is the instantaneous expected return on assets, σ is the instantaneous standard deviation 
of returns, and Wt is a Wiener process. The payoff of a European call option with strike price X 
on the expiration date, t
*
, is the greater between 0 and the difference between At* and X, or 
MAX[0, At* – X], while the payoff of a European put option is MAX[0, X – At*]. In a 
frictionless market, the ‘no arbitrage opportunities’ condition (Black and Scholes, 1972) holds:15 
Ct = AtN(d1) – Xe
-rT
N(d2)         
                                               
15 The ‘no arbitrage opportunities condition’ states that ‘[…] in equilibrium a riskless hedge cannot yield a return 
greater than the short term interest rate in the market, the option must be priced such that market participants could 
not establish this hedge and expect to realize a sure profit.’ (Black and Scholes, 1972, p.400).  
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d1 = [ln(At/X)+ (r + 0.5σ
2
) T]/ σT0.5   
d2 = d1 – σT
0.5
          (A2) 
Pt = Ct + Xe
-rT
 – At        (A3) 
where Ct is the price of the call option (for one share), Pt is the price of the put option (for the 
same share), r is the short-term rate of interest, T is the duration of the option (time to 
expiration), and N(.) is the value of the cumulative distribution function of the standard Normal 
distribution. According to Merton (1977), the face value of debt of a corporation, D, can be seen 
as the strike price of a call, or X in equation (A2). In such circumstances, the equity value of the 
bank, Et, can be calculated using: 
Et = AtN(d1) – De
-rT
N(d2)        (A4) 
where D is the face value of debt. The cost of deposit insurance, Gt, can be modelled according 
to (A3), but with an adjustment to consider the fraction of the bank liabilities that consists of 
insured deposits, η = D1/D. If all pre-insurance debt is of equal seniority, depositors (in the 
absence of deposit insurance) will receive the lower between the future value of deposits, 
FV(D1), and the pro-rated fraction of the value of the total assets of the bank, Atη. The payoff 
generated by the deposit insurance at maturity is MAX[0, FV(D1) – Atη] (Ronn and Verma, 
1986). The deposit insurance premium can be modelled as follows: 
Gt = N(h2) – (1 – δ)(At/De
-rT
)N(h1)       
h1 = {ln[D/At(1 – δ)] – T(r + 0.5σ
2)} /σT0.5      
h2 = h1 + σT
0.5
          (A5) 
where Gt is the premium of the deposit insurance per each dollar of insured deposits, equivalent 
to the value of a put with a strike price equal to total debt (D) divided by D1, δ is the dividend 
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per dollar of At, assuming that dividends are paid once for each period. Equation (A5) shows 
that, ceteris paribus, a larger δ increases Gt because it decreases At. Note that in equation (A4) 
dividends do not decrease the value of equity because equity is dividend-protected (Ronn and 
Verma, 1986). If deposit insurance exists in the banking system, banks that pay dividends can 
increase the value of deposit insurance by paying dividends. Banks are also incentivised to 
increase the debt-to-assets ratio, because this decreases At/De
-rT
. 
The value of a debt in a leveraged bank which pays dividends is: 
Ft = De
-rT
 [N(f2) + (1 – δ)(At/De
-rT
)N(f1)]       
f1 = – {0.5σ
2
T – ln[De-rT/ At(1 – δ)]} /σT
0.5
 
f2 = – {0.5σ
2
T + ln[De
-rT
/At(1 – δ)]} /σT
0.5
       (A6) 
Therefore, dividends reduce the value of bank assets and the overall amount that debt holders 
can claim in the event of liquidation. Dividends reduce the value of debt because debt, unlike 
equity, is not dividend-protected. Given the face value of uninsured debt, D2 = D – D1, 
dividends decrease the probability that uninsured debt holders will be repaid if the bank 
collapses. Assume that, in the event of a default, all insured depositors are paid by the deposit 
insurance scheme, so that uninsured debt holder can claim the total of the assets of the bank, At. 
Then, the future value of uninsured debt for banks that do not pay dividends is:  
FV(D2)  = min[At, D2]        (A7)  
For banks that pay dividends, the future value of uninsured debt is:  
FV(D2)*  = min[(1 – δ)At, D2]        (A8) 
Note that for any δ > 0, if (1 – δ)At < D2, then FV(D2)* < FV(D2). Paying dividends benefits 
common shareholders because they receive cash while debt holders do not, and dividends 
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reduce the probability that uninsured debt holders will be paid in full. This effect is stronger for 
banks for which D2 is large. As D2 increase (for instance, because of the issuance of hybrid 
capital instruments, as in Acharya et al, 2011), De
-rT
N(d2) in equation (A4) approaches AtN(d1), 
and Et → 0. Therefore, banks may increase the debt-to-assets ratio to increase Gt (to the extent 
that this is allowed by capital adequacy regulation), but in so doing the value of equity would 
decrease, as it would be for a call option with a larger strike price. Banks with Et → 0 may 
attempt to increase Et by increasing business risk, which in the BS-model can be represented by 
σ (Merton, 1973). More risk increases the payoff of a call option conditional on the option being 
exercised. This can be easily shown taking the first derivative of (A4) with respect to σ (also 
called Vega):
16
 
∂Et/∂σ = Atn(d1)T
0.5
         (A9) 
Where n(.) is the probability density function of the standard Normal distribution. Given that At 
≥ 0, n(d1) ≥ 0, and T
0.5 ≥ 0, it follows that an increase in business risk brings about a higher 
value of Et. What is the impact of business risk on the current value of debt, Ft? As shown in 
Merton (1974), Ft = At – Et. Therefore, there is a negative relation between Ft and Et. Due to the 
positive relation between σ and Et (equation A9), it follows that Ft is negatively related to σ, i.e. 
an increase in business risk decreases the current value of the debt (see also Merton, 1974, p. 
455). Therefore, as said in the introduction, ceteris paribus dividends and the issuance of debt 
decrease the capital ratio and incentivise risk taking. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16 For a derivation of (A9), please refer to Garven (2009), pp. 13-14.  
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Table 1. Explanatory variables in regressions on payout ratios (DP, DY, and TP): Definitions and 
expected sign of the coefficients.  
Proxy Definition Expected sign  
of the coefficient 
LnZ Natural logarithm of the Z-score: 
LnZit = ln(Zit)= ]/)/[(ln itititit SDROATAEROA   
where Return on Assets (ROA) is the net income of bank i in period t plus the loan 
loss provision of bank i in period t divided by the total assets of bank i in period t. 
The variable Eit is the total equity (including common and preferred share capital 
and equity reserves) and TAit is the total assets of bank i in period t. Finally, ROA 
volatility is calculated as  
 ∑
1t
-1=t
2
iitit -
1-T
1
A

 ROAROASDRO  with ∑
2-T
-1t
iti
T
1

 ROAROA  and T = 3. 
Negative  
(risk-shifting 
hypothesis) 
Naïve DD    
V
V
naive
naivedebtnaiveMVT
DDNaive

 25.0/ln 

 
 
Where naïve debt is the face value of bank i debt at time t (subscripts omitted for 
readability), which approximates the market value of bank’s debt. σE is the 
annualized monthly standard deviation of returns, and MVE the market value of 
equity. The volatility of debt is: naïve σD = [0.05 + 0.25σE], and the total value of 
the firm is: MVT = [MVE + naïve debt]. The volatility of assets is: naïve σV = 
[σE(MVE/MVT) + naïve σD(naïve debt /MVT)]. The expected return on the bank’s 
assets, naïve μ, is the annual bank stock return 
Negative      
(risk-shifting 
hypothesis) 
Expected Default 
Frequency (EDF) 
Φ(–Naïve DD), where Φ(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
Naïve DD 
Positive (risk-
shifting 
hypothesis)  
 
Negative for       
(–EDF) 
Close Dummy variable: 1 if Tier 1 < 6% or TCR < 10%, and 0 otherwise Negative 
(opportunity cost 
hypothesis) 
High Charter Dummy variable: 1 if the ratio of customer deposits to total assets  is larger than the 
sample median, and 0 otherwise. For the subsample of 166 listed banks, the dummy 
is based on the market-to-book ratio. 
Negative (charter 
value hypothesis) 
Proxies for Insider–Outsider (IO) conflict and other control variables  
Recorded 
Shareholders 
Number of recorded shareholders in 2009
c
 Positive  
Listed Bank Dummy variable: 1 if bank i is listed on the stock market in period t, and 0 
otherwise
 
Positive/Negative  
IND1  Dummy variable: 1 if there is no shareholder with more than 25% of total 
ownership in 2009,
c
 and 0 otherwise 
Positive  
IND2  Dummy variable: 1 if there is a shareholder with more than 25% of total ownership 
but no shareholder with more than 50% of total ownership in 2009,
c
 and 0 otherwise 
Excluded from 
regressions to 
avoid perfect 
collinearity 
IND3  Dummy variable: 1 if there is a shareholder with more than 50% of total ownership 
in 2009,
c
 and 0 otherwise 
Negative  
Profitability Net income of bank i in year t plus the loan loss provision of bank i in year t divided 
by the total assets of bank i in year t. I prefer using ROA over return on equity 
because it does not take into account the effect of leverage on profitability and risk. 
Positive  
Loan Growth Log of loans of bank i in period t minus log of loans of bank i in period t - 1  Negative  
Size  Log of assets of bank i in period t Positive  
Earned Equity  Retained earnings of bank i in period t divided by the total equity of bank i in period 
t 
Positive  
IPO Dummy variable: 1 if bank i went public in period t, and 0 otherwise Positive  
U.S. Dummy variable: 1 if bank i has its headquarters in the U.S. and 0 otherwise Positive 
 
I report the expected sign of the coefficients on the basis of the findings of previous literature. Notes continue in next page 
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    Notes to Table 1 continued 
 
a 
The IO conflict should be stronger in cases where the shareholding base is more dispersed. The number of recorded shareholder s 
and listing on a stock exchange should be positively related to shareholding dispersion, and should therefore lead to higher payout 
ratios. However, quotation on a stock exchange can act as a monitoring device for shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984). Thus, the  
expected coefficient of Listed Bank may be positive or negative (or insignificant). The dummy variables IND1, IND2, and IND3 are 
independence indicators. Because Listed Bank, Recorded Shareholders, and the independence indicators are highly correlated, they 
are included one at a time in my multivariate analysis.  
b 
To allow for earnings management, I calculate the ROA as the sum of net income and loan loss provisions, divided by total assets. 
However, the pairwise correlation between the unadjusted ROA and the adjusted ROA is 0.8178, (significant at the 1%), and 
therefore the results are likely to hold, irrespective of the proxy chosen.  
c 
Bankscope provides data for these variables only as of the last accounting year available. However, because these data tend to be 
sticky, it is unlikely that this has affected my results.  
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Table 2.Construction of the sample: 741 U.S. and EU banks, sample period 2000–2007, annual data.  
 Search criterion Number of banks 
Panel A: All banks.  
Step 1 
Geographic: U.S. and EU (27) , 
for the period 1999-2008                                                                            
25,104 
Step 2 
Specialisation: BHCs, 
commercial banks, cooperative 
banks, savings banks 
22,585 
Step 3 
Consolidated accounts: C1 and 
C2 in Bankscope                                                                    
3,974 
Step 4  
Information availability: listing 
on a stock exchange (listed, 
unlisted, or delisted)  
3,968 
 
Step 5 
Information availability: 
dividends for year t and for year 
t – 1 
1,193 
Step 6 
Information availability: other 
explanatory variables 
741 
Panel B: Sub-sample of 166 listed banks. 
Step 7 
Information availability on 
Thomson Analytics  
187 
Step 8 
Information availability: 
dividends for year t and for year 
t – 1 
184 
Step 9 
Information availability: other 
explanatory variables 
166 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics: 741 U.S. and EU banks, sample period 2000–2007, annual data.  
    U.S. EU Listed Unlisted All 
Sample 
composition 
All Banks 435 306 396
a 
352 741 
BHCs 354 29 287
 
 99 383 
Commercial 78 200 89
 
 193 278 
Cooperative 1 44 16 29 45 
Savings 2 33 4 31 35 
DP 
Obs 2234 679 1705 1208 2913 
Mean 0.415 0.382 0.406 0.408 0.407 
SD 0.810 0.397 0.555 0.932 0.735 
p50 0.339 0.306 0.356 0.268 0.333 
p1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p99 2.323 1.886 1.669 2.564 2.106 
LnZ 
Obs 2234 679 1705 1208 2913 
Mean 4.328
***
 3.786 4.305
***
 4.056 4.201 
SD 0.934 1.078 0.943 1.050 0.996 
p50 4.323 3.794 4.309 4.121 4.216 
p1 1.675 1.338 1.992 1.329 1.539 
p99 6.596 6.641 6.587 6.627 6.596 
Capital Ratio 
Obs 2234 679 1705 1208 2913 
Mean 0.098
***
 0.077 0.091
**
 0.095 0.093 
SD 0.039 0.051 0.037 0.050 0.043 
p50 0.091 0.068 0.089 0.086 0.088 
p1 0.054 0.017 0.028 0.022 0.026 
p99 0.262 0.237 0.179 0.315 0.255 
SDROA 
Obs 2234 679 1705 1208 2913 
Mean 0.003
**
 0.004 0.002
***
 0.004 0.003 
SD 0.007 0.016 0.006 0.014 0.010 
p50 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
p1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p99 0.022 0.036 0.016 0.028 0.023 
Profitability  
 
Obs 2234 679 1705 1208 2913 
Mean 0.014
***
 0.012 0.013
*
 0.014 0.014 
SD 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.011 
p50 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 
p1 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.001 
p99 0.051 0.047 0.036 0.059 0.051 
Close 
Obs 2234 679 1705 1208 2913 
Mean 0.016
***
 0.090 0.031 0.036 0.033 
SD 0.124 0.286 0.174 0.185 0.179 
p50 0 0 0 0 0 
p1 0 0 0 0 0 
p99 1 1 1 1 1 
High Charter  
Obs 2234 679 1705 1208 2913 
Mean 0.623
***
 0.178 0.554
***
 0.469 0.519 
SD 0.485 0.383 0.497 0.499 0.500 
p50 1 0 1 0 1 
p1 0 0 0 0 0 
p99 1 1 1 1 1 
All the statistics are shown for banks for which DP and the explanatory variables (including the first lag of the payout ratio, DP(-1)) 
are available. Observations for which the payout ratio is negative are dropped. Table 1 reports a detailed description of each variable 
in the regressions. 
a 
Seven banks went public or were delisted during the sample period (three BHCs and four commercial banks). For this reason, they 
appear as both listed and unlisted, respectively, causing the sum of the banks in the columns Listed and Unlisted to be 748 instead of 
741. 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the means of the two sub-samples (U.S. and EU, or Listed and Unlisted) are significantly 
different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, according to a two-sample t-test with unequal variances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics: Sub-sample of 166 US and EU listed banks, sample period 2000-2007, 
annual data. 
    U.S. EU All 
Sample composition 
All Banks 106 60 166 
BHCs 105 13 118 
Commercial 1 37 38 
Cooperative 0 7 7 
Savings 0 3 3 
DY 
Obs 400 132 532 
Mean 0.027*** 0.054 0.034 
SD 0.018 0.094 0.051 
p50 0.025 0.031 0.026 
p1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P99 0.082 0.550 0.190 
 Obs 400 132 532 
 Mean 0.387*** 0.278 0.360 
Naïve DD SD 0.409 0.397 0.408 
 p50 0.285 0.120 0.251 
 p1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 P99 1.679 1.839 1.690 
EDF 
Obs 400 132 532 
Mean 0.363*** 0.403 0.373 
SD 0.129 0.125 0.129 
p50 0.388 0.452 0.401 
p1 0.047 0.033 0.045 
P99 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Close 
Obs 400 132 532 
Mean 0.003*** 0.136 0.036 
SD 0.050 0.344 0.186 
p50 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P99 1.000 1.000 1.000 
High Charter 
Obs 400 132 532 
Mean 0.570 0.606 0.579 
SD 0.496 0.490 0.494 
p50 1 1 1 
p1 0 0 0 
P99 1 1 1 
All the statistics are shown for banks for which DY and the explanatory variables (including the first lag of the payout ratio, DY(-1)) 
are available. Table 1 reports a detailed description of each variable. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the means of the two 
sub-samples (U.S. and EU) are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, according to a two-sample t-test 
with unequal variances. 
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Table 5. Regression results for the dividend payout ratio (DP): 741 U.S. and EU banks, sample period 
2000–2007.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole sample BHC and commercial banks 
         
DP(-1) 0.304*** 0.300*** 0.283** 0.276** 0.303*** 0.300*** 0.277** 0.272** 
 (0.109) (0.111) (0.122) (0.125) 
 
(0.1102) (0.113) (0.124) (0.128) 
LnZ -0.081*** -0.084*** -0.134** -0.142** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.152** -0.156** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.058) (0.060) 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.063) (0.063) 
Close  -0.562***  -0.704***  -0.569***  -0.730*** 
  (0.184)  (0.242) 
 
 (0.202)  (0.251) 
Close x LnZ  0.114***  0.151**  0.113**  0.156** 
  (0.043)  (0.059) 
 
 (0.048)  (0.062) 
High Charter  -0.534** -0.562**   -0.619** -0.633** 
   (0.246) (0.250)   (0.261) (0.260) 
High Charter x LnZ  0.116** 0.123**   0.136** 0.139** 
   (0.058) (0.059)   (0.062) (0.061) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observ.s 2913 2913 2913 2913 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,749 
Banks 741 741 741 741 661 661 661 661 
Wald χ2 74.66 93.49 84.31 102.1 78.00 98.17 92.09 109.6 
Hansen 14.98 14.70 16.24 15.72 14.42 14.20 15.03 14.57 
Hansen  
p-value 
0.243 0.259 0.180 0.204 0.275 0.288 0.240 0.266 
Number of 
instruments 
28 30 30 32 28 30 30 32 
m1 -1.715 -1.709 -1.665 -1.656 -1.699 -1.695 -1.642 -1.635 
m2 0.576 0.545 0.563 0.527 0.533 0.512 0.513 0.484 
m1 p-value 0.086 0.088 0.096 0.098 0.0893 0.0901 0.101 0.102 
m2 p-value 0.564 0.586 0.573 0.598 0.594 0.609 0.608 0.628 
Table 5 reports the results for equation (1), where the dependent variable is the ratio of dividends to net income (DP). Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The variable LnZ (natural logarithm of the Z-score) is considered to be endogenous. In specifications 2 
and 4, Close is a dummy variable equal to one if Tier 1 < 6% or TCR < 10%, and zero otherwise. In specifications 3 and 4, High 
Charter is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of customer deposits to total assets is larger than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. Controls include the variables Loan Growth, Size, Earned Equity, IPO, Listed Bank, U.S., and year dummies. Table 1 
reports a detailed description of each variable in the regressions. Notations m1 and m2 refer to tests for the absence of first- and 
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. Under the null hypothesis, m1 and m2 are asymptotically 
distributed as standard normal variables with mean zero and variance one. The statistic m2 being significantly different from zero is 
not consistent with the assumption of no serial correlation across disturbances (the assumptions of the GMM-SYS model are invalid). 
Hansen refers to the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions, distributed asymptotically as χ2(df) when the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of the instruments is satisfied. All GMM-SYS regressions are estimated using a two-step approach and standard errors are 
adjusted using Windmeijer (2005) small-sample variance correction (Roodman, 2006). The superscripts ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 6. Regression results for the dividend payout ratio (DP) – English Origin and English Origin 
with only BHC and Commercial banks. Sample period 2000-2007. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 English Origin (Whole sample) English Origin (BHC and commercial banks) 
         
DP(-1) 0.401*** 0.403*** 0.358*** 0.359*** 0.397*** 0.399*** 0.350*** 0.351*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.117) (0.117) (0.093) (0.093) (0.116) (0.116) 
LnZ -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.194*** -0.193*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.199*** -0.197*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.057) (0.056) (0.029) (0.029) (0.057) (0.057) 
Close  -0.562***  -0.809***  -0.561***  -0.819*** 
  (0.148)  (0.222)  (0.148)  (0.222) 
Close x LnZ  0.094***  0.153***  0.094***  0.155*** 
  (0.032)  (0.050)  (0.032)  (0.050) 
High Charter  -0.888*** -0.874***   -0.913*** -0.899*** 
   (0.254) (0.249)   (0.256) (0.251) 
High Charter x LnZ  0.191*** 0.188***   0.196*** 0.194*** 
   (0.058) (0.057)   (0.058) (0.057) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observ.s 2,287 2,287 2,287 2,287 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 
Banks 464 464 464 464 460 460 460 460 
Wald χ2 104.8 257.2 109.0 246.4 104.9 252.9 108.3 245.3 
Hansen 9.283 9.409 9.162 9.205 9.000 9.122 8.766 8.806 
Hansen  
p-value 
0.679 0.668 0.689 0.685 0.703 0.692 0.723 0.719 
Number of 
instruments 
28 30 30 32 28 30 30 32 
m1 -1.872 -1.875 -1.808 -1.813 -1.867 -1.870 -1.799 -1.804 
m2 0.998 1.006 1.075 1.084 0.988 0.997 1.056 1.067 
m1 p-value 0.061 0.061 0.071 0.070 0.062 0.061 0.072 0.071 
m2 p-value 0.318 0.314 0.282 0.278 0.323 0.319 0.291 0.286 
Table 6 reports the results for equation (1), where the dependent variable is the ratio of dividends to net income (DP). Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The variable LnZ (natural logarithm of the Z-score) is considered to be endogenous. In specifications 2 
and 4, Close is a dummy variable equal to one if Tier 1 < 6% or TCR < 10%, and zero otherwise. In specifications 3 and 4, High 
Charter is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of customer deposits to total assets is larger than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. Controls include the variables Loan Growth, Size, Earned Equity, IPO, Listed Bank, U.S., and year dummies. Table 1 
reports a detailed description of each variable in the regressions. Notations m1 and m2 refer to tests for the absence of first- and 
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. Under the null hypothesis, m1 and m2 are asymptotically 
distributed as standard normal variables with mean zero and variance one. The statistic m2 being significantly different from zero is 
not consistent with the assumption of no serial correlation across disturbances (the assumptions of the GMM-SYS model are invalid). 
Hansen refers to the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions, distributed asymptotically as χ2(df) when the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of the instruments is satisfied. All GMM-SYS regressions are estimated using a two-step approach and standard errors are 
adjusted using Windmeijer (2005) small-sample variance correction (Roodman, 2006). The superscripts ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 7. Regression results for the dividend payout ratio (DP) –  Effects of PCA: 741 U.S. and EU 
banks, sample period 2000–2007. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole sample BHC and commercial banks 
         
DP(-1) 0.311*** 0.303*** 0.290** 0.280** 0.309*** 0.303*** 0.285** 0.276** 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.121) (0.124) (0.110) (0.112) (0.124) (0.126) 
LnZ -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.133** -0.140** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.152** -0.156** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.058) (0.059) (0.031) (0.031) (0.063) (0.063) 
Close  -0.529***  -0.666***  -0.564***  -0.723*** 
  (0.188)  (0.237)  (0.209)  (0.248) 
Close x LnZ  0.124***  0.160***  0.132***  0.177*** 
  (0.043)  (0.058)  (0.049)  (0.063) 
High Charter  -0.524** -0.551**   -0.609** -0.625** 
   (0.243) (0.249)   (0.259) (0.260) 
High Charter x LnZ  0.114** 0.121**   0.134** 0.138** 
   (0.058) (0.059)   (0.062) (0.062) 
PCA -0.207*** -0.186*** -0.205*** -0.196*** -0.204*** -0.183** -0.202*** -0.203*** 
 (0.044) (0.066) (0.053) (0.069) (0.044) (0.074) (0.054) (0.077) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observ.s 2913 2913 2913 2913 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,749 
Banks 741 741 741 741 661 661 661 661 
Wald χ2 141.4 147.9 127.7 159.5 146.0 140.6 132.7 161.2 
Hansen 15.14 15.02 16.39 16.04 14.60 14.52 15.12 14.85 
Hansen  
p-value 
0.234 0.240 0.174 0.189 0.264 0.269 0.235 0.250 
Number of 
instruments 
29 31 31 33 29 31 31 33 
m1 -1.725 -1.717 -1.679 -1.668 -1.710 -1.702 -1.657 -1.646 
m2 0.620 0.571 0.616 0.561 0.577 0.533 0.567 0.512 
m1 p-value 0.084 0.086 0.093 0.095 0.087 0.089 0.098 0.100 
m2 p-value 0.535 0.568 0.538 0.574 0.564 0.594 0.571 0.609 
Table 7 reports the results for equation (1), where the dependent variable is the ratio of dividends to net income (DP). Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The variable LnZ (natural logarithm of the Z-score) is considered to be endogenous. In specifications 2 
and 4, Close is a dummy variable equal to one if Tier 1 < 6% or TCR < 10%, and zero otherwise. In specifications 3 and 4, High 
Charter is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of customer deposits to total assets is larger than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. PCA is a dummy equal to one if Close=1 and U.S.=1, and zero otherwise. Controls include the variables Loan Growth, Size, 
Earned Equity, IPO, Listed Bank, U.S., and year dummies. Table 1 reports a detailed description of each variable in the regressions. 
Notations m1 and m2 refer to tests for the absence of first- and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, 
respectively. Under the null hypothesis, m1 and m2 are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables with mean zero and 
variance one. The statistic m2 being significantly different from zero is not consistent with the assumption of no serial correlation 
across disturbances (the assumptions of the GMM-SYS model are invalid). Hansen refers to the test statistic for over-identifying 
restrictions, distributed asymptotically as χ2(df) when the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments is satisfied. All GMM-SYS 
regressions are estimated using a two-step approach and standard errors are adjusted using Windmeijer (2005) small-sample variance 
correction (Roodman, 2006). The superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 8. Regression results for the dividends to market value of equity ratio (DY) using BS (2008) 
‘naïve’ distance to default measure: 166 listed banks, sample period 2000–2007. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole sample BHC and commercial banks 
         
DY(-1) 0.445*** 0.438*** 0.332*** 0.333*** 0.512** 0.506** 0.422** 0.423** 
 (0.140) (0.139) (0.116) (0.117) (0.210) (0.211) (0.185) (0.185) 
Naïve DD -0.008*** -0.008** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) 
Close  -0.006  -0.005  -0.008  -0.005 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Close x Naïve DD 0.007  0.004  0.007  0.002 
  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.031) 
High Charter  -0.017*** -0.016***   -0.013*** -0.013*** 
   (0.005) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
High Charter x Naïve DD  0.046*** 0.045***   0.033*** 0.033*** 
   (0.015) (0.015)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observ.s 532 532 532 532 511 511 511 511 
Banks 166 166 166 166 156 156 156 156 
Wald χ2 121.8 119.2 148.5 144.4 145.2 144.6 193.7 194.3 
Hansen 8.114 7.686 7.492 7.086 7.820 7.747 6.409 6.409 
Hansen  
p-value 
0.618 0.659 0.678 0.717 0.646 0.653 0.780 0.780 
Number of 
instruments 
22 24 24 26 22 24 24 26 
m1 -1.087 -1.093 -1.357 -1.342 -1.203 -1.203 -1.374 -1.372 
m2 -1.068 -1.065 -0.727 -0.742 -0.233 -0.219 0.308 0.307 
m1 p-value 0.277 0.274 0.175 0.180 0.229 0.229 0.169 0.170 
m2 p-value 0.286 0.287 0.467 0.458 0.816 0.827 0.758 0.759 
Table 8 reports the results for equation (1), where the dependent variable is the ratio of dividends to market value of equity (DY). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The variable Naïve DD is considered to be endogenous. In specifications 2 and 4, Close is 
a dummy variable equal to one if Tier 1 < 6% or TCR < 10%, and zero otherwise. In specifications 3 and 4, High Charter is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the market-to-book ratio is larger than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Notations m1 and m2 refer to 
tests for the absence of first- and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. Under the null hypothesis, 
m1 and m2 are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables with mean zero and variance one. The statistic m2 being 
significantly different from zero is not consistent with the assumption of no serial correlation across disturbances (the assumptions of 
the GMM-SYS model are invalid). Hansen refers to the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions, distributed asymptotically as 
χ2(df) when the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments is satisfied. All GMM-SYS regressions are estimated using a two-step 
approach and standard errors are adjusted using Windmeijer (2005) small-sample variance correction (Roodman, 2006). The 
superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 9. Regression results for the total payout ratio (TP) using BS (2008) ‘naïve’ distance to default 
measure: 166 listed banks, sample period 2000–2007. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole sample BHC and commercial banks 
         
TP(-1) 0.567*** 0.585*** 0.556*** 0.572*** 0.543*** 0.556*** 0.534*** 0.544*** 
 (0.089) (0.092) (0.086) (0.089) (0.092) (0.094) (0.088) (0.089) 
Naïve DD -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011) 
Close  -0.007*  -0.006  -0.008  -0.006 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Close x Naïve DD 0.004  0.002  0.004  0.004 
  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.026) 
High Charter  -0.011*** -0.010***   -0.011*** -0.011*** 
   (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
High Charter x Naïve DD  0.030*** 0.029***   0.033*** 0.032*** 
   (0.010) (0.011)   (0.010) (0.010) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observ.s 532 532 532 532 511 511 511 511 
Banks 166 166 166 166 156 156 156 156 
Wald χ2 326.2 324.6 486.1 475.9 342.8 335.0 469.9 466.2 
Hansen 4.720 5.124 4.188 4.771 5.018 5.173 3.655 3.925 
Hansen  
p-value 
0.944 0.925 0.964 0.942 0.930 0.922 0.979 0.972 
Number of 
instruments 
22 24 24 26 22 24 24 26 
m1 -3.168 -3.138 -3.555 -3.521 -3.158 -3.145 -3.581 -3.564 
m2 0.165 0.192 0.423 0.436 0.123 0.152 0.583 0.588 
m1 p-value 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
m2 p-value 0.869 0.848 0.672 0.663 0.902 0.880 0.560 0.556 
Table 9 reports the results for equation (1), where the dependent variable is the total payout ratio (TP): Dividends plus share 
repurchases divided by the market value of equity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The variable Naïve DD is considered to 
be endogenous. In specifications 2 and 4, Close is a dummy variable equal to one if Tier 1 < 6% or TCR < 10%, and zero otherwise. In 
specifications 3 and 4, High Charter is a dummy variable equal to one if the market-to-book ratio is larger than the sample median, 
and zero otherwise. Notations m1 and m2 refer to tests for the absence of first- and second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced residuals, respectively. Under the null hypothesis, m1 and m2 are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables 
with mean zero and variance one. The statistic m2 being significantly different from zero is not consistent with the assumption of no 
serial correlation across disturbances (the assumptions of the GMM-SYS model are invalid). Hansen refers to the test statistic for 
over-identifying restrictions, distributed asymptotically as χ2(df) when the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments is satisfied. 
All GMM-SYS regressions are estimated using a two-step approach and standard errors are adjusted using Windmeijer (2005) small-
sample variance correction (Roodman, 2006). The superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
